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Abstract Mind reading (i.e. the ability to infer the mental state of another agent) is taken
to be the main cognitive ability required to share an intention and to collaborate. In this
paper, I argue that another cognitive ability is also necessary to collaborate: representing
others’ and ones’ own goals from a third-person perspective (other-centred or allocentric
representation of goals). I argue that allocentric mind reading enables the cognitive ability
of goal adoption, i.e. having the goal that another agent’s achieve p because and as long as
another agent has that goal that p. Having clarified the relevance of mutual goal adoption
for acting jointly, I argue that when an intention is shared between several agents, each
individual has an intention in favour of the joint action and one in favour of a joint mode of
reasoning. This mode of reasoning is allocentric reasoning. Finally, I elaborate on the
consequences of this view for the scientific study of human collaboration.
Keywords Shared intention .Goaladoption .Third-personperspective .Collaboration .
Allocentric representations . Social cognition
Introduction
Being able to collaborate is one of the most important behavioural traits displayed by
our species (Tomasello et al. 2005). For a long time, this aspect of human sociality
has received only scant attention probably because the overall alignment of incentives
that is typical of joint actions seemed to suggest that collaboration is unproblematic,
at least from an evolutionary perspective. This traditional neglect is nowadays under
revision. Contemporary theories of the evolution of human intelligence emphasize the
significance of being able to coordinate in joint action contexts (Sterelny 2007; Moll
and Tomasello 2007) and hypothesize that the human brain is especially adapted for
making decisions in a social world (Frith and Frith 2010).
It is thus understandable that lately in philosophy (Searle 1990; Bratman 1993;
Tuomela 1995; Sugden and Gold 2007) and in psychology (Knoblich et al. 2011),
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there has been much interest in developing new conceptual frameworks to explore the
cognitive pre-requisites for joint action and collaboration. Given that the peculiar
cognitive abilities of collaboration have been only limitedly explored in the past, the
interplay between philosophy and psychology on this topic is particularly relevant.
Though different theories vary a lot in their details, there is a growing consensus
that in order to further our understanding of how we are able to collaborate, the ability
to share mental states (e.g. beliefs, desires and intentions) is of paramount impor-
tance.1 In this perspective, two agents are able to collaborate if they are able to share
an intention to act together. Thus, understanding what it means to share an intention
and how we can do it would explain collaboration.
In this paper, my aim is to offer a new analysis of the mental attitudes that
constitute a shared intention: what the nature of a shared intention is. To do so, I
first briefly summarize the relevant concept of intention, the relation between shared
intention and joint action and the two constitutive roles of a shared intention. Then I
identify a cognitive ability whose role in supporting joint action is often overlooked:
In order to engage in joint intentional action, two agents should be able to act in order
to promote a goal of another agent because and as long as such goal is another
agent’s goal.2 This is the cognitive ability of goal adoption (Castelfranchi 2003).
While the role of mind reading is well recognized (see Apperly 2012 for a compre-
hensive overview), I argue that goal adoption is enabled by a combination of mind
reading and the ability to represent somebody else from a third-person perspective.
Having cleared the stage, I then argue that two individuals can rationally form an
intention that they carry out a joint action if they engage in mutual goal adoption
(“Intending that we reason about how to J from the third-person perspective”
section). However, goal adoption is also crucial to understand how agents that share
an intention are prepared to independently choose means that are compatible with
each other. To show that it is so, I avail myself of the game theoretical analysis of
coordination problems. Applying some basic tools of bargaining theory to coordina-
tion games makes the relevance of the third-person perspective explicit. On these
grounds, I argue that goal adoption plays a crucial role in enabling agents to share an
intention: It is required in order to form both the intention in favour of the coordinated
action and that in favour of a joint mode of reasoning. In order to assess this proposal,
I then compare it with two other prominent ones (Bratman’s analysis and team-
reasoning approaches. I conclude by briefly elaborating on the consequences of this
analysis for the scientific study of human collaboration.
1 Exactly what we share and how we can share it is still, however, matter of debate. See for instance the
various contributions in Butterfill and Sebanz (2011).
2 For the aim of this paper, the term ‘desire’ and ‘goal’ are used interchangeably to refer to the same kind of
mental state with propositional content: a desire that p is synonymous with a goal that p. To have a ‘desire’
or ‘goal’ means to be in a state with which the world must fit (see Smith 1987 for the notion of ‘direction of
fit’ and its application to desires). While the term ‘desire’ is conventionally adopted in philosophy of mind
and action, the term ‘goal’ is mostly used in psychology of motivation and neuroscience of action. For an
extended discussion of the concept of goal as the prototypical conative mental state that considers desire as
a sub-case, see Castelfranchi (2012).
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The relation between joint action and shared intention
Not every kind of social interactions between two or more persons is usefully
understood as a case of joint action. Contrast, for instance, two friends taking a
walk together with two strangers who happen to walk alongside without
bumping into each other. Behaviourally, these two cases might look similar.
But, at a closer inspection, one can notice that only in the former situation their
reciprocal coordination is intended by the participants, and this intentional fact
makes their coordinated movements a case of joint action. Alternatively one
can say that when two friends take a walk together, they share an intention to
do it, while two pedestrians walking alongside to each other do not seem to
share a similar attitude towards their coordinated action. Still, an appeal to a
shared intention to explain joint action is vacuous, if an analysis of what it
takes to share an intention is not offered.
There are indeed many competing theories of shared or collective intentionality
(see for instance Gilbert 1990 and Bratman 2009a for two alternative proposals that
start from the previous paradigmatic example). However, in this paper, I will only
focus on the approach developed by Michael Bratman (1993, 2007, 2009a) for three
main reasons.
The first reason is pragmatic: Besides its philosophical merits, Bratman’s
theory has been also useful to organize empirical data in developmental and
comparative psychology (Tomasello et al. 2005; Warneken et al. 2006) and to
formulate new comprehensive theories amenable to be empirically tested
(Pacherie 2008, 2012), thus fostering the interdisciplinary dialogue between
philosophy and psychology. The second is that, besides action, Bratman’s
framework takes into account aspects of reasoning and deliberation that are
often neglected by those who are interested in the cognitive foundations of joint
action but, as I will argue, are crucial to properly analyze collaboration.3
Finally, Bratman’s characterization of shared intention is grounded on his
planning theory of intention (Bratman 1987), an approach that will be endorsed
as a background in this contribution.
The planning theory of intention
To clarify the conceptual tools that frame the discussion that follows, it is
useful to provide a short summary of the main tenets of the planning theory of
intention (Bratman 1987). Bratman’s theory of intention is a variety of func-
tionalism (Lewis 1972): An intention is identified with a kind of mental state
that plays a particular set of roles in a cognitive system. Specifically, in this
theory, an intention is crucially linked to our ability to pursue goals that, in
order to be achieved, require the temporal coordination of several actions
(Bratman 1987). This temporal dimension is crucial to understand intentions,
3 The importance of modes of reasoning to understand shared or collective intentions is also characteristic
of team-reasoning approaches to joint action; see for instance Sugden and Gold 2007 and “Beyond
Bratman’s semantic strategy” section below.
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which are viewed as embedded in larger future-directed plans with specific
guiding, coordinating and organizing roles in our practical reasoning and
action.4
According to the planning theory, associated with these roles, there are character-
istic norms of instrumental rationality that are implicitly accepted by an agent.
Typical norms are those of consistency, agglomeration, means-end coherence and
stability. For instance, intentions are supposed to be internally consistent and consis-
tent with one’s beliefs. An agent should be able to agglomerate her different in-
tentions into a larger one that is consistent in these ways. Moreover, having an
intention demands that the agent settle on relevant means when appropriate.
Finally, an intention should be stable over time and should involve resistance to
reconsideration and change (see Bratman 1987, 2009b for a thorough defence of
these norms).
The appeal to these roles and norms allows discriminating intentions from other
mental states like beliefs and desires or goals. Ordinary goals are not subject, for
instance, to norms of consistency and means-end coherence: One can have several
goals that are inconsistent with each other in the sense that they cannot be realized at
the same time. Moreover, simply having a goal is not by itself enough for settling on a
means to achieve it. Moreover, the roles and norms characteristic of intentions fit with
each other in the sense that a general conformity to the norms of consistency,
agglomeration, means-end coherence and stability contributes to how the guiding,
coordinating and organizing roles of intentions are fulfilled.
Grounding shared intentions on personal intentions
Such an approach to the nature of intention has been employed to also understand how
an intention can be shared between two or more agents, e.g. from Alice’s personal
intention to take a walk to Alice’s and Bob’s shared intention to take a walk together.
Like in the individual case, an intention that is shared between (at least) two agents is
supposed to be a state that plays the same coordinating, guiding and structuring roles in
their joint action and reasoning. In particular, according to Bratman, the characteristic
roles of a shared intention to do a joint action J include the interpersonal coordination of
action and planning in the pursuit of J and the structuring of related bargaining and
shared deliberation concerning how to J (see Bratman 1993).
Again, as in the case of personal intentions, these (social) roles are associated with
such (social) norms as social agglomeration and consistency, social coherence and
social stability (Bratman 2009a). That is, agents sharing more than one intention
should be able to agglomerate them into a larger social plan that is consistent, that
specifies relevant means in a timely way and that is stable over time in a way that
resists to constant reconsideration. Agents who comply with these norms will share
4 Thus, the only of kind of intention that will be relevant for the aim of this paper is the one that Pacherie
(2008) has called distal intention (pp. 182–184). Pacherie usefully distinguishes between distal, proximate
and motor intentions. Distal intentions are relevant for the rational guidance and control of action,
proximate intention for situational guidance and control and motor intention for the motor ones (p. 188).
I assume that a similar distinction is appropriate for shared intention as well. Hence, the present discussion
will only concern shared distal intention.
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an intention that plays the distinctive roles of coordinating, guiding and structuring
their reciprocal planning and acting.
Bratman’s peculiar strategy, at this point, is to understand the nature of shared
intention by relating the roles and norms at the level of personal intentions with the
social roles and social norms at the level of the agents’ shared agency. In this
perspective, a shared intention is reduced to a web of interdependent and interlocked
personal intentions of the individual participants. In particular, Bratman argues that
such interdependence and interlocking is achieved through the contents of the
participant’s personal intentions. In other words, each participant’s personal intention
refers to the joint action, to the way the joint action is supposed to unfold and to the
way that sub-plans of each of the participants should combine (see “Beyond
Bratman’s semantic strategy” section below for a critical appraisal of this strategy).
When this structure of personal intentions in a context of common knowledge
functions properly (i.e. as specified by the planning theory of intention), it realizes
the characteristic social roles of an intention that is shared between the agents. Thus, a
shared intention is identified with whatever plays these social roles, i.e. with the set of
personal intentions of the individual participants, the relation between these inten-
tions and the relevant beliefs (see for an extended argument in favour of this approach
Bratman 1993, 2007, 2009a, c).
Since the planning theory of personal and shared intentions exemplifies a
functionalist approach, it is left open whether the peculiar structure of personal
intentions that, according to Bratman, constitutes a shared intention is the only
possible realization of a shared intention or whether it can be realized in a
different way (see Bratman 1999, p. 144). Indeed, an alternative (and more transparent)
realization of a shared intention is precisely what this paper aims to offer.
The enabling role of goal adoption as a cognitive ability
Given the role that knowledge of others’ beliefs and intentions plays in
Bratman’s account, his theory clearly presupposes that agents sharing an
intention are equipped with a sophisticated level of mind reading ability.
Bracketing for the moment possible critiques of requiring such cognitive
sophistication to explain joint action (see for instance Tollefsen 2005,
Pacherie 2011 and “Beyond Bratman’s semantic strategy” section below),
here I want to suggest that, besides standard mind reading, two agents
sharing an intention to do a joint action J (e.g. paint a house together)
should display the more general ability of goal adoption.
By goal adoption, I mean the ability to form the goal that another agent’s
goal is achieved because and as long as it is the goal of that other agent
(Conte and Castelfranchi 1995, pp. 44–56; Castelfranchi 2003). More pre-
cisely, goal adoption is a mental act: It is the formation of a conditional
goal, that is, the goal that another agent achieve p is conditional on the
belief that the other agent has the goal that p.5 Being a mental act, goal
5 I will use the expression ‘adopted goal’ to refer to the goals that an agent form when engaging in goal
adoption.
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adoption is a mental event analogous to judgment or decision; if a judgment
is the mental act of forming a belief and a decision is the mental act of
forming an intention, goal adoption is the mental act of forming a goal that
another agent’s goal is achieved.
Goal adoption is the terminal stage of a practical reasoning process in
which, for instance, if an agent has the goal that q and believes that he will
not achieve it unless he adopts another agent’s goal that p, then he will form
the goal that the other agent achieves p. This particular case of practical
reasoning will be named ‘adoptive reasoning’.
Importantly, by adopting another agent’s goal, the adopting agent forms a
goal with a characteristic social content (i.e. that another agent achieves his
own goal). Moreover, goal adoption is also a basic process to come to have
goals with a social origin (i.e. another agent). Defined in this way, goal
adoption is clearly different from imitation in which one inherits a new goal
from another agent: In imitation, for instance, one is not motivated by the
goal that another agent achieve something.
Moreover, and more importantly, even if adoptive reasoning is a kind of
practical reasoning that is crucially socially oriented, it does not necessarily
imply any benevolence or altruism with respect to the other agent. For
instance, a typical non-altruistic goal adoption underlies the exchange of
goods in the marketplace. A simple act of trade between two agents exem-
plifies reciprocal goal adoption: For Alice to obtain something she wants
from Bob the butcher, she has to adopt Bob’s goal to get a proportionate
amount of money and act in order that Bob achieve it, for instance, by
paying, similarly for Bob who has to adopt Alice’s goal to get the meat and
has to act in view of its fulfilment, i.e. by giving the meat to her (Conte and
Castelfranchi 1995, p. 51; Sugden 2011).
In general, one can distinguish two different reasons for adopting some-
body else’s goal. In the case of market exchange, goal adoption might be
simply instrumental: If Alice’s goal is to get the meat and she believes that
unless she adopts Bob’s goal to have some money in return, she will not get
it, Alice has an instrumental reason to adopt Bob’s goal.6 Goal adoption,
however, can also be based on altruistic motivations. Suppose Alice is
benevolent with regard to her friend Bob, meaning that she is motivated
by a general attitude towards Bob: She wants Bob to obtain what he wants
in a terminal way (i.e. this goal of Alice’s is not instrumental to other goals
of hers). If she decides to help him with some of his projects, she will
engage in benevolent goal adoption, i.e. goal adoption for purely altruistic
reasons.
In both cases, the kind of social orientation that is implicit in successful
goal adoption is a form of de-centred or other-centred cognition. Thus, the
relevant opposition is not between self-regarding (egoistic) and other-
6 Even if exchanging goods is not motivated by altruism, this does not mean that the underlying motivation
should be necessarily selfish, in that it can be driven by a motivation of mutual advantage. On the fact the
market exchange might also be construed as a form of collaboration, see Sugden (2009). For an early
analysis of exchange and goal adoption, see Castelfranchi and Parisi (1984).
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regarding (altruistic) motivations in which one cares about another agent’s
welfare,7 but between self-centred (egocentric) and other-centred (allocentric)
ones in which one comes to have a goal from the third-person perspective of
somebody else be that either for instrumental or for benevolent reasons.8
Even if exchanging goods does not require altruistic motivations, it does
require goal adoption: the ability to see a choice from a perspective that is
different from one’s own, to understand what option someone else values and
to instrumentally act in view of such knowledge in order to fulfil someone
else’s goals. The adopted goal is an other-centred goal that is a goal that one
entertains from an allocentric perspective.
In order to see the relevance of this point more clearly, consider the
difference between a situation in which Alice has the key to a door, wants
to go out and thus forms the goal to open the door and a situation in which
Alice still has the key and Bob is in front of the door. In this latter scenario,
Alice might instrumentally adopt Bob’s goal to exit and open the door in
order to let him exit just because she cannot stand his presence in the house.
Though the content of the goal is the same in the two scenarios (i.e. that the
door is opened), in the former case Alice’s has the goal from her own
egocentric perspective, while in the latter Alice’s goal is held from the
allocentric perspective of Bob’s and she acts in order that Bob’s achieve it.
Thus, even such a trivial case of instrumental goal adoption demands that
Alice smoothly switches between an egocentric and allocentric perspective in
order to get what she wants.
The importance of goal adoption and the cognitive sophistication it requires
in terms of other-centred representations, is, unfortunately, widely
underestimated in current debates on cooperation and collaboration. Indeed,
it is striking that, humans aside, the ability to intentionally promote a goal of
another animal, even when doing so is instrumental to create the conditions to
promote one’s own goals, is a behaviour that seems not to be available to
other animals; chimpanzees, for instance, despite their quite sophisticated mind
reading abilities, are remarkably incapable of instrumental helping (see for
instance Warneken and Tomasello 2006 and “Conclusion” section below).
Mutual goal adoption enables the intention that we do the joint action
Consider now a complex goal like that of having a whole house painted, an
outcome for which two agents, say Alice and Bob, knowingly depend on each
other. As we have seen, the constitutive role of a shared intention is to enable
7 The key aspect of an other-regarding preference is that ‘one’s evaluation of a state depends on how it is
experienced by others’ (Bowles 2004, p. 109). This aspect makes social or other-regarding preferences the
standard model of altruistic motivations.
8 An allocentric representation in social cognition is the adoption of a third-person perspective when
representing somebody else instead of a first-person egocentric and self-related one (Frith and de
Vignemont 2005; Frischen et al. 2009). The egocentric representation of another’s goal is the representation
of such goal and of the means to achieve it in a way that is relevant for oneself (i.e. that satisfies one’s own
goals). The allocentric representation of another’s goal is the representation of such goal and of the means
to achieve it in a way that is independent from oneself.
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the agents to achieve this kind of goal since having a whole house painted
requires a temporally extended joint action. In order to successfully perform a
joint action, the interpersonal coordination of action and planning of several
agents and the structuring of possible bargaining and deliberation concerning
how to do it should be ensured.
Suppose that, given their mutual dependence with respect to the common
goal that the house is painted, both Alice and Bob independently formulate
the goal to paint the house together. Having the goal to do a joint action J is
not, however, the same as having decided to pursue it (i.e. forming the
intention) because one cannot intend something that is beyond one’s personal
control, and an intention that we paint the house seems to be such a case
(see on this point Velleman 1997).
Consider, however, that Alice has the goal that she and Bob paint the
house together and believes that unless Bob have that same goal, the house
will not be painted (i.e. they are mutually dependent). Alice will form the
goal that Bob too has the goal that they paint the house together. If Bob is
aware of this goal, he might decide to engage in adoptive reasoning towards
Alice. This means that Bob can independently realize that unless he adopts
Alice’s goal that they paint their house together, he will not have the whole
house painted. If Bob engages in instrumental goal adoption, he will form
the goal that Alice’s goal is achieved because and as long as it is her goal.
Thus, assuming that the same is true of both, they might also adopt the goal
that we do the joint action from each other for purely instrumental reasons,
e.g. Bob adopts Alice’s goal that they paint the house together only because
doing so is instrumental to his own goal to have the house painted and vice
versa for Alice with respect to Bob. Thus, even if each of them might
originally have independent reasons to have the goal of doing the joint
action, reciprocal goal adoption would offer additional support to such
personal goals: that the other’s goal to do the joint action is fulfilled.
Reciprocally adopting their goals to do the joint action creates a new
structure of interdependence between such goals, which are now entertained
also because and as long as the other one has it: Their adopted goals to do
the joint action are conditional on their reciprocal beliefs that each of them
has that goal.9
As a consequence, once the participants commonly know that each has the
goal to do the joint action also because and as long as the other has it (i.e.
their reciprocal goal adoption is commonly known), each participant can decide
to pursue it and thus rationally form a personal intention in favour of the joint
activity. This is now rationally possible because each individual intention to do
9 Interlocking intentions or interdependence between the intentions that we J is also a core feature of
Bratman’s analysis (Bratman 2009a, pp. 159, 161). In my strategy, intentions are interlocking in virtue of
the interdependence between the adopted goals that we J. Since each agent adopts the other’s goal, each
goal is conditional on the belief that the other has that goal. If one were to revise this belief, one would not
have the adopted goal. As a consequence, one could not rationally intend that we J. Bratman, on the other
hand, postulates that each agent has an additional intention that the joint action go in part by way of the
relevant intention of each of the participants. This semantic strategy is critically assessed below.
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the joint action leads to their jointly acting in part also by supporting the
intention of the other one.10
A personal intention that we paint a house together is, hence, rationally possible
thanks to the adoption of each other’s goal that we paint the house. Once such an
intention is formed, it will play the distinctive guiding, coordinating and organizing
roles specified by the planning theory of intentions. If each participant has an
individual intention-like commitment towards the joint activity, the joint action will
be an element in the participants’ individual plans. The norm of consistency requires
that the personal intentions of the agents be internally consistent and consistent with
their beliefs. The norm of means-end coherence mandates that, individually, each
agent should settle on relevant means for the joint action (e.g. aim at the coordinated
use of some paint in order to paint the house together), and such personal plans
should be consistent with the joint action. Each participant’s personal intention in
favour of the joint action should resist reconsideration. That is, each individual agent
will be responsive to the joint action and not simply to their individual shares in it.
How do we make the right choice in a coordination problem?
Such individual responsiveness to the joint action is not, however, enough to fully
support the interpersonal coordination of action and planning in the pursuit of J and
the relevant bargaining and deliberation regarding the most appropriate means. In
particular, the intentions in favour of the joint activity do not ensure social agglom-
eration since the sub-plans that each may intend to select in order to J may be
incompatible with each other.
To see exactly why it is so, suppose, for instance, that both Alice and Bob have
already formed an intention to paint a house together (i.e. an intention that we J). At
some point, Alice and Bob should settle on relevant means to paint it, e.g. choose a
specific colour with which the house should be painted.
The interactive decision problem that Alice and Bob would face can be described
as follows. To make it simple, assume that they already are in a situation of common
knowledge of each other’s preference ranking. They both already know (and know
that the other knows and so on) that each of them likes blue houses. The only other
available possibility is to use a yellow colour. But they both know (and know that
they both know and so on) that they both prefer living in a blue house than living in a
10 My reply to Velleman’s objection is close in spirit to the one offered by Bratman (1999) himself (p. 154).
Highlighting the role of instrumental goal adoption, however, has several advantages. In order to rebut
Velleman’s objection, Bratman assumes a ‘kind soul’ condition. According to Bratman, you can individ-
ually form an intention to do a joint action, on the assumption that the other is ‘kind soul’. That is, when the
other fellow recognizes your intention that we J, he will come to have a corresponding intention that we J.
This implies that knowledge of your intention that we J is a reason for the other to form a similar intention
when he has altruistic motives (the ‘kindness’ of the soul). This assumption, however, is both not necessary
and not sufficient. It is not necessary because it is evident that we can share intentions also for instrumental
reasons (the joint option is in the self-interest of both and we know it). It is not sufficient because it does not
discriminate cases in which an agent is completely self-centred and ignores the other in pursuing the joint
action, provided that the other is altruistic. Egocentricity in the pursuit of a joint action is not acceptable
when one is collaborating. See below section for a defence of this claim.
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yellow house. Finally, it is also common knowledge between them that the worst
possible situation is to have half of the house painted in blue and the other half
painted in yellow.
The matrix in Fig. 1 shows Alice’s and Bob’s reciprocal ranking of possible
outcomes, i.e. how the world would be after their choices. The best outcome for
both is the one in which they both use the blue paint. An acceptable, but less preferred
one, is when both use the yellow paint. What would be really annoying is mixing the
colours. This is the ‘choose-the-colour’ game.
Selecting an equilibrium in the choose-the-colour game
The choose-the-colour game is an instance of a class of strategic interactions
that are known as common-interest games. These are situations in which the
agents (or players) have a common interest in acting in a coordinated way.
Common interest games represent the prototypical case of interactive decisions
in a joint action context.
As it is exemplified in the choose-the-colour game, the agents have a symmetrical
(or at least compatible) preference ranking such that the strategy that is favoured by
one of them (what is best to do, given what the other would do) is the same strategy
preferred by the other. This means that the strategies favoured by both—their strategy
profile—are also a Nash equilibrium.11
We can safely assume that in common interest games, each player has an intention
that we coordinate; however, coordination is at risk because there are multiple
equilibria. Since coordination in such situations is not guaranteed, players need to
solve a ‘coordination problem’ (Schelling 1960).
Consider for example a coordination game like in Fig. 2. Players 1 and 2 are
playing the game of matching their sides of pennies. If they both show the head side
of their coin at the same time, they win. The same is true, if they both turn the tail side
of their coin. However, each of them loses if they fail to match their pennies, or, in
other words, if they fail to coordinate. So if the agents intend to coordinate with each
other, what should they do in this situation?
If player 1 thinks that player 2 will choose head, then the best reply is to play head
too. At the same time, if player 2 thinks that player 1 will choose head, then, again,
the best reply is to play head. So both expectations are correct and are confirmed by
best-replying agents: Head–Head is a Nash equilibrium. However, the same is true of
the Tail–Tail profile, which is for the same reasons an alternative Nash equilibrium of
Alice
Paint Blue Paint Yellow
Bob
Paint Blue 2,2 0,0
Paint Yellow 0,0 1,1
Fig. 1 The choose-the-colour game
11 A strategy profile is a Nash equilibrium if given what the other can do, the best response of one agent is
the same response the other would choose adopting identical reasoning towards him or her. For the limited
aims of this paper, it is enough to consider only Nash equilibria in pure strategies. For the distinction
between Nash equilibrium in pure and mixed strategies, see Osborne and Rubinstein (1994).
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this game. Thus, the logic of Nash equilibrium—beliefs and instrumental rationality
are conducive of facts that match the beliefs—is insufficient to suggest a definite
course of action in these situations.
The choose-the-colour game that has been introduced above is actually a variant of
this game and, in its more abstract version, is known as the Hi-Lo game.12 The only
difference with a coordination game in which there is complete indifference between
alternative Nash equilibria is that in the Hi-Lo game, one equilibrium is Pareto
superior to the others.13 That is, in the choose-the-colour game, both Alice and Bob
are better off when they both choose the blue paint than when they both choose the
yellow one.
However, if being in a coordination problem can in fact threaten coordination
when there is indifference between equilibria, it seems strongly intuitive that—even
when the participants cannot communicate with each other—the only ‘right’ solution
of this game is to choose the outcome that is most preferred by both (e.g. the outcome
in which both use the blue paint). However, the logic of Nash equilibrium considers
the profile of strategies in which both paint a yellow house just as good as that in
which both paint a blue house. Since both are Nash equilibria, the Nash equilibrium
solution concept does not predict what the agents in this game are going to do. By the
same logic, even in a Hi-Lo situation, the fact that both Alice and Bob might have the
intention that they coordinate over some relevant means (i.e. the intention that we J)
does not by itself suggest any specific course of action.
The behavioural and judgmental facts of the Hi-Lo game
While the choose-the-colour game seems problematic when viewed through the
lens of game theory, this kind of social interaction is not puzzling at all in our
everyday life. Discussing the Hi-Lo game in general, Bacharach (2006, p. 42)
has pointed out two generally accepted facts about this game: the behavioural
and the judgmental facts.
The behavioural fact is the idea that real people, when facing a social
interaction of the Hi-Lo kind, almost always have no difficulties in choosing
the outcome that is best for all (i.e. they easily coordinate on the Hi-Hi
equilibrium and systematically ignore the Low-Low one).14 The judgmental
fact, on the other hand, refers to the widespread intuition that the Hi-Hi profile
of strategies is the obvious ‘right’ choice for agents in this situation even when
the interaction does not allow for repetition.
12 See Hodgson (1967), Sugden (1993) and Bacharach (2006).
13 The fact that one equilibrium is Pareto superior means that at least one agent is better off in that outcome,
while the other agent scores at least as good as in the other equilibrium.
14 This intuitive result has also been experimentally verified; see Bardsley et al. (2010).
Player 1
Head Tail
Player 2
Head 1,1 0,0
Tail 0,0 1,1
Fig. 2 The game of matching tail and head
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Thus, the Hi-Lo game as such has been considered mainly as a problem for the
descriptive and normative adequacy of the game-theoretical framework itself, which
should be designed in a way that delivered the choice of the Hi-Hi outcome both as an
empirical prediction and as a normative judgement. In the next sections, my aim is to
offer an explanation of both facts in order to make the cognitive ability required to
solve this problem explicit.
Beyond personal preferences: empathetic preferences
The standard treatment of preferences in game theory is limited to the personal
preferences of the individual decision makers. Adopting the revealed preference
approach, an agent’s personal preferences are discovered by observing the choices
the agent makes when solving one-person decision problems. Moreover, by observ-
ing the choices the agent makes between risky prospects, it is possible to represent
such preferences in terms of numerical utilities that also measure how much an
outcome is preferred over another one (for the standard procedure, see Von
Neumann and Morgenstern 1944).15
An agent, however, may have preferences besides her personal ones. Extending the
standard view, Harsanyi (1977) and (Binmore 1994, 2005) have introduced the idea that,
in some contexts, one can also infer empathetic preferences from the agent’s choices and
that these preferences should be kept apart from an agent’s personal ones.16
In the normative project of Harsanyi, the peculiar contexts that may require an
appeal to empathetic preferences are those in which an agent wishes to make a moral
judgement (i.e. to answer the question ‘what is the right thing to do?’). Making this
judgement, it is suggested, requires one to take an impartial viewpoint.
Following this line of thought, but turning the project into a descriptive one,
Binmore has contended that these special contexts are those in which we have to
solve coordination problems but we are unable to discuss face to face on what to
do—thus cases analogous to the choose-the-colour game discussed above. In these
situations, Binmore suggests, we may act according to a ‘do-as-you-would-be-done’
principle (Binmore 2005, pp. 17, 130). The way this principle works in practice
presupposes that agents facing a coordination problem may independently select an
equilibrium on which to converge by empathizing with their fellows, that is, by
putting themselves in the position of another agent to see a choice from this different
point of view. In this view, acting according to the do-as-you-would-be-done princi-
ple would reveal empathetic preferences.
While standard personal preferences are defined over outcomes, empathetic pref-
erences differ because they are defined over pairs (i, x) where i is a person and x is a
social situation (Sugden 2001, p. F227). The idea is that a given individual k in a
social situation x can have a preference between ‘being the individual i in social
situation y’ and ‘being the individual j in social situation z’. Since one cannot choose
15 In the revealed preference interpretation, preferences and utilities are considered as descriptive concepts
of what an agent would do when facing certain decision problems. In this view, these constructs are not
used to explain a choice or to refer to what causes an agent to act in a certain way. For a different
interpretation of preferences and utility, see the discussion in Sugden (1991).
16 The expression ‘empathetic preferences’ is Binmore’s (1994: 56–61). Harsanyi (1977) names the same
construct ‘extended preferences’ (p. 53).
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to be another agent, these alternatives are to be considered as imaginary ones and
manifest the ability of an agent to conceive in his or her imagination what it would be
to see a choice from another agent’s point of view and assessing an outcome in light
of another agent’s preferences.
Harsanyi (1977, pp. 54–55) has shown that, assuming that such preferences are
consistent and that the agents are very good at empathizing, thereby knowing each
other’s real preferences, it is possible to represent such preferences in a single
empathetic utility function. The only additional assumption that is needed to obtain
this result is that, in his or her imagination, an agent considers that it is equiprobable
that, after a choice is made, one turns out to be either oneself or the other person in the
chosen state. Though this is again only an imagined possibility, it is taken to express
the impartiality of the point of view.
The empathetic utility function describes how an agent compares the utility that
she and the other one gets from different outcomes and combines them in an overall
assessment of outcomes that is simply the average of the empathetic utilities of all.
Thus, an empathetic utility function implicitly determines a standard for making
interpersonal comparison of utility: It determines a rate at which the utility units of
one are traded against those of the other. In order to compare the utilities of different
agents, each agent must be associated with a weight that specifies the worth of an
outcome for each one (Binmore 2005: 28–29).17 The weight of the agents may vary
in different contexts and could take into account for example the effort, talent and
social status of each agent. However, in the simplest cases of sociality that are
relevant for this paper, the agents engage in small-scale egalitarian joint actions in
the absence of asymmetric authority relations (see Bratman 2009a; Pacherie 2012).
Moreover, we can assume that they bring the same talent and effort to the joint
project. This egalitarian aspect can be expressed by the fact that they have equal
weight (e.g. 1:1). Given this simplification, when making a judgement according to
the do-as-you-would-be-done principle and thus acting according to their empathetic
utility functions in the context of a joint action, the agents are independently seeking
to maximize the sum of their reciprocal weighted personal utilities.
Allocentric utility function and the impartial viewpoint
As we have seen, both Harsanyi and Binmore attach great explanatory importance to
the ability of empathy. Here I want to suggest empathy suggests a role of emotions
that is not necessary while that the ability that is required is a more general form of
mind reading: allocentric mind reading.
According to common usage in psychology (Hoffman 1978; Meltzoff 2002),
empathy is primarily an emotional response that is caused by someone else’s
experiencing a similar emotion. Empathy is different from the phenomenon of
emotional contagion in that an agent who empathizes with someone else’s emotional
state is ascribing the emotion one is feeling to someone else. For instance, suppose
that Alice sees that Bob is in pain and as a consequence she starts experiencing some
pain herself. If Alice is empathizing with Bob’s pain, she feels an emotional response
that is similar to the one Bob is feeling, and she experiences it because of Bob.
17 Binmore names this weight the ‘social index’ of the agent.
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Moreover, even though she is feeling something similar to what Bob is feeling, she
does not mistake this emotion as a feeling of hers but she ascribes it to Bob: Alice
knows that she is feeling pain because of Bob but that pain is Bob’s pain and not
hers.18 If one were not to acknowledge the special role of emotion in empathy, one
could not distinguish empathy from the more general ability of mind reading in which
an agent comes to have a mental state (e.g. a belief) because another agent has a
similar mental state while ascribing that mental state to the other.
The important point of empathy, though, is that it is an other-centred or allocentric
process (Hoffman 1978; Meltzoff 2002): When Alice empathizes with Bob’s pain,
she feels an emotion from the third-person perspective of Bob: She knows that this is
how Bob is feeling. But since the emotional component of empathy does not play any
role in Harsanyi’s and Binmore’s theories, we can dispense with empathy altogether.
What is really implied by an agent acting according to the do-as-you-would-be-done
principle is the ability to engage in mind reading from an other-centred or allocentric
stance and not from the standard self-centred or egocentric perspective. What we
have to assume that the agents are very good at is switching to allocentric mind
reading in the appropriate contexts. Assuming that an agent is a perfect allocentric
mind reader means that she is able to understand the other’s goals without error and
represent them from a third-person or allocentric perspective.
Moreover, an allocentric mind reader can decide to adopt such goals and thus form
the further goal that the other achieve them. If we also assume that an agent can
switch to an allocentric stance also towards her own personal goals,19 when deciding
what to do, such an agent would trade her own personal allocentric goals against
those adopted from the other one. The allocentric utility function and the correspond-
ing allocentric preferences are a way to formally represent this possibility.20
In sum, an agent who acts according to her allocentric preferences is making an
impartial choice, which is nothing but a choice taken from a third-person perspective
in which one balance one’s own and the other’s goals from an impartial viewpoint.
The impartial viewpoint is just the third-person or allocentric one.
Bargaining from an impartial viewpoint in simulation
In order to appreciate the role of allocentric mind reading and allocentric preferences
in finding a solution in coordination problems, however, it is useful to understand
what would happen if the agents were able to bargain face to face on what is the
outcome to pursue. If we restrict our attention to the simplest possible case of the
choose-the-colour game, the analysis is straightforward. In this trivial game, the set of
18 For extended discussion of empathy, see Vignemont and Singer (2006) and Vignemont and Jacob
(2012).
19 Frith and de Vignemont (2005) indeed distinguish between two attitudes towards the self: egocentric
representations of the self that derive from direct knowledge attached to the self in the first-person
perspective and allocentric representations of the self that derive from detached knowledge of the person
one happens to be as if one was looking at oneself from a third-person perspective (p. 725). Here I am
considering only the special case of personal goals that can be either egocentrically or allocentrically
represented.
20 Thus, instead of the expression ‘empathetic’ preferences and ‘empathetic’ utility function from now on I
will use the expression ‘allocentric’ preferences and ‘allocentric’ utility function. Despite the terminological
difference, I am referring to the same phenomenon discussed in the previous section.
L. Tummolini
Author's personal copy
possible agreements is represented by the outcome in which Alice and Bob have a
blue house (with payoffs of 2:2) and that in which they have a yellow one (with
payoffs of 1:1). All the outcomes in which they do not use the same colour can be
considered as their disagreement point. The game theoretical analysis of bargaining
predicts that, when two agents negotiate face to face, having common knowledge of
their personal characteristics and of the nature of the bargaining problem, they will
agree on the Nash bargaining solution. The Nash bargaining solution is the outcome
in which the product of the players’ gains over their disagreement payoffs is largest.21
In the choose-the-colour game, this is the outcome in which both Alice and Bob paint
a blue house.
Granted this, however, the choose-the-colour game has been introduced to model
the social situation in which Alice and Bob have to decide what to do without having
discussed this matter beforehand. In this situation, they may ask themselves the
question ‘what is the right thing to do?’ separately. Thus, if both are good at
allocentric mind reading, both are able to see their choice also from the perspective
of the other one, and so they will exploit their allocentric preferences to solve this
problem. By acting according to the do-as-would-be-done principle, each will indi-
vidually compare their allocentric utilities and make a decision that maximizes the
sum of the weighted personal utilities of both.22 This means that both will choose to
use the blue paint, which corresponds, in the trivial case of the choose-the-colour
game, like in all the garden variety of Hi-Lo games, to the Nash bargaining solution
of the corresponding bargaining game. That is, applying their ability to switch to
allocentric mind reading and their allocentric preferences in this context entails that
they coordinate on the deal that they would agree if they were to bargain in ignorance
of their reciprocal identities (Binmore 2005).
Explaining the behavioural and judgmental facts in the Hi-Lo game
As discussed above, even if standard game theory is unable to predict and prescribe the
choice of Hi in one-shot Hi-Lo problems, people almost always choose Hi in real decisions
(the behavioural fact) and are ready to acknowledge that Hi is the ‘right’ choice in this
context (the judgmental fact). The account that I have sketched suggests that choosing Hi in
the Hi-Lo game is explained as the output of a simulated process of bargaining. The Pareto
superior outcome is the obvious deal that the agents would choose if they were to discuss
thematter face to face. Understanding this, however, requires that one is able to switch to an
allocentric perspective in order to see a choice from the third-person viewpoint and to take
into account the goals of another one by adopting them. The limiting case of the Hi-Lo
game makes this choice trivial due to the perfect alignment between the agents’ interests.23
The pretended ignorance of each other identities when computing the possible deal is a way
21 See Chapter 7 of Osborne and Rubinstein (1994) for an introduction to bargaining games.
22 This process works only if we assume that the agents use the same standard for interpersonal comparison
of utility. In the context of an egalitarian joint action and assuming that both agents bring the same talent
and effort to the joint project, I have suggested before that this implies that both agents weight their
reciprocal utilities equally (the weight is 1:1) in their allocentric utility functions.
23 However, in more complex situations in which a level of conflict between the personal preferences is
introduced, the same mechanism can ease coordination on some form of compromise; see Binmore (2005)
for an extended discussion of these more interesting situations.
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to model, in these situations, the allocentric perspective. Thus, the appeal to
allocentric mind reading and goal adoption, and to non-standard preferences
like allocentric preferences, is offered as a descriptive account of the behav-
ioural fact: This cognitive ability is involved in the actual choices of Hi in real
contexts.
The same approach, moreover, offers an explanation of the judgmental fact.
Actually, the framework of allocentric preferences has been developed by Harsanyi
(1977) precisely to model the normative judgment of agents in similar situations. The
emphasis on morality both in Harsanyi (1977) and Binmore (2005) is due to the fact
that similar problems also arise when coordinating on multiple equilibria in which the
interests of the agents are not perfectly aligned. If making a judgment according to the
do-as-you-would-be-done principle in a Hi-Lo context does not require any personal
sacrifice, in other contexts it may correspond to an appeal to a fairness criterion. In
the Hi-Lo case, choosing Hi is the right choice because it the choice that conforms to
this principle and, at the same time, is the one that, when viewed from a third-person
perspective, is the best choice for everyone.
Intending that we reason about how to J from the third-person perspective
Let us take stock. I have argued that, besides generic mind reading that is
clearly needed to infer what goals and beliefs each agent has, two agents
sharing an intention to do a joint action J (e.g. paint a house together) need
to switch to an allocentric representation of each other. Moreover, the agents
facing a coordination problem should properly exploit their allocentric utility
functions, that is, they should choose by also taking into account how each
option is valued by their co-actors from a third-person perspective. When seen
in this way, coordination on an outcome is a form of simulated bargaining
which parallels the way in which the agents would bargain face to face if they
had the opportunity. Thus, the interpersonal coordination and the structuring of
bargaining and shared deliberation that are constitutive roles of shared intention
are strictly linked to the allocentric abilities and preferences of the agents.
Finally, since preferences are used here to describe the observable choices of
the agents (i.e. preferences are revealed by choices), the allocentric utility
function that trades one’s own allocentric utilities against those of another agent
presupposes the ability of goal adoption.
Thus, the two constitutive roles of a shared intention imply that the agents display
mutual goal adoption also regarding the choice of the means that are relevant for the
joint action. In other words, besides the intention in favour of the joint action (i.e. the
intention that we J), each agent should have an intention in favour of mutual goal
adoption in the pursuit of the joint action, i.e. the intention that we adopt each other’s
goals when deciding how to J.
An intention in favour of joint goal adoption is simply a commitment to reason in
a strategic decision-making context by appealing to the agents’ allocentric prefer-
ences and not to their personal preferences. This is a mode of reasoning in which one
reasons adoptively towards the other and represents one’s own goals from a third-
person perspective too. To stress this aspect, I will name it allocentric reasoning. For
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reasons already discussed, such mode of reasoning promotes interpersonal coordina-
tion and structure bargaining and shared deliberation, and so it is needed to fulfil the
roles that a shared intention is supposed to play.
Of course, an intention in favour of a joint form of reasoning is not different from
one in favour of a joint action. As for the latter intention, an individual cannot hold
the former one alone: the way in which two agents reason together is not under the
control of any of them separately. Hence, in order to intend this joint mode of
reasoning, such intention must be formed on the grounds that the agents are engaging
in mutual goal adoption. Though they may have independent reasons as well, each of
them comes to have the goal to engage in joint allocentric reasoning on how to do the
joint action because and as long as the other one has such a goal, and each is thus
disposed to shift to a more egocentric mode if and when the other drops out.
I think that the adoptive origins of the intention that we engage in joint allocentric
reasoning when choosing the appropriate means for a joint project nicely correspond
to our experience of collaborating with others. It is common experience that when we
are part of a collaborative enterprise we are disposed to take into account how our
partners value certain options, provided that—and also because of—their similar
reasoning towards us. Whenever this does not happen or ceases to happen, collabo-
ration typically goes awry and one is left wondering whether the two of us were
‘really’ collaborating in the beginning.
Shared intention: the adoptive approach
We now have all the conceptual resources to offer a new analysis of shared intention.
When two or more agents share an intention to act together, each has (1) an intention
in favour of a joint action—an intention that we J—and (2) an intention in favour of
joint allocentric reasoning in the pursuit of the joint action—an intention that we
reason about how to J from a third-person perspective. Even if these intentions are
mere personal intentions of the participants, (3) the goals on which they are based are
interdependent because both (3a) the goal to do the joint action and (3b) the goal to
engage in joint allocentric reasoning over the means for the joint action are, in part,
(4) the output of a mutual goal adoption process. When (5) the structure of
interdependency between these goals and the relevant intentions are common knowl-
edge, a shared intention between two or more agents is realized.
This shared intention has the constitutive roles of supporting interpersonal
coordination and of structuring relevant bargaining and shared deliberation. The
social norms of social agglomeration and consistency, social coherence and
social stability emerge from an appropriate functioning of the personal inten-
tions of the participants in a context of common knowledge. A shared intention
with specific social properties is, thus, realized only thanks to individual mental
attitudes and processes.
Beyond Bratman’s semantic strategy
The adoptive approach to shared intention is here proposed as an alternative realiza-
tion of a shared intention as first analyzed by Michael Bratman (1993). Since it
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presupposes the planning theory of intention (Bratman 1987) and the two distinctive
roles that identify a shared intention, it is not offered as a challenge to Bratman’s own
analysis (see Bratman 1993, 1999, 2009a, c, 2007). Notwithstanding so, the adoptive
approach presents some advantages.
Bratman’s strategy to ground a shared intention in the personal intentions
of the agents mainly exploits the semantic interconnection between the
intentions of the agents (see for instance Bratman 2009a, p. 157). Taking
this strategy means that, in order to specify a structure of interrelated
personal intentions able to play the roles of interpersonal coordination and
structuring of bargaining and shared deliberation, Bratman has to postulate,
in addition to the intention in favour of the joint activity, two other personal
intentions that explicitly refer (1) to the role of each other intentions in the
joint action (e.g. each of the participants should have an intention that they
act jointly by way of each other’s intention to act jointly) and (2) to the fact
that possible sub-plans are mutually compatible (e.g. each of the participants
should have an intention that they act jointly by way of meshing sub-plans).
These highly complex contents have limited both the transparency of
Bratman’s proposal and the domain of applicability of the theory. Tollefsen
(2005), for instance, has suggested that young children lack the sophisticated
mind-reading ability that is required to infer mental states with such a
complex content (see also Knoblich and Sebanz 2008). Since, however, 2-
year-old children already manifest the behavioural traits characteristic of
collaboration (Warneken et al. 2006), there is a need for an analysis of
shared intention that is compatible with this evidence.
The adoptive approach to shared intention is thus a valuable alternative
since is possibly less demanding as far as understanding of each other’s
intentions is concerned. It requires that the participating agents have the
ability to form goals with social content, but this content is just that the
other one achieves what he wants. It implies that agents are able to form
allocentric representations of others’ goals and are able to switch between
egocentric and allocentric perspectives. It does not need interconnectedness in
the content of intentions because the interdependence is due to the fact both
participants’ relevant goals (i.e. that we act jointly and that we choose the
means from the third-person perspective) are adopted from each other.
Though we do not know enough about allocentric mind reading and its
development (Frith and de Vignemont 2005), in the context of spatial cog-
nition, the ability to form an allocentric representation of object position is
already displayed by 2-year-old children (Ribordy et al. 2013). Interestingly,
Warneken and Tomasello (2006) have shown that children of this age are
already quite proficient ‘goal adopters’.
Finally, Bratman’s analysis looks like a still image of the participants’ reciprocal
mental attitudes without any understanding of the process that underlies the formation
of such complex intentions. Castelfranchi and Paglieri (2007) have argued that a
model of the process of intention generation helps to clarify the nature of intentions as
distinctive mental states. The present focus on goal adoption and on the relation
between reciprocal goal adoption and the intentions in favour of a joint action and a
joint mode of reasoning is in the same spirit.
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Before team-oriented approaches
The adoptive approach to shared intention bears some similarity also with team-
oriented approaches to collective intention (see for instance Gold and Sugden
2007 and Sugden 2011). Rejecting any attempt to identify a collective intention
with a list of constitutive mental states, Gold and Sugden (2007) suggest that
an intention has the property of being individual or collective only relative to
the mode of practical reasoning that the agents endorse to infer it. They argue
that the distinctive mode of reasoning that generates a collective intention is
team reasoning in which agency is attributed to groups and not to individuals
(see also Sugden 2000, 2011 and Bacharach 2006).
When two agents face a situation of mutual dependence and have a common
interest, each player might identify with a group. According to Bacharach
(2006), for instance, the interdependency of the players and the perfect align-
ment of interests in the Hi-Lo game facilitate that a player thinks about herself
and her co-player as ‘us’. From the perspective of the group, one is thereby
identified with, each player can conclude that we should choose Hi-Hi (because
that is best for us) and that, if I am part of us, I should choose Hi.
When viewed from the perspective advance here, Bacharach’s proposal
seems to suggest that the agents are disposed to switch from their personal
egocentric perspectives to a group-level ego-centric one that can be called we-
centric. Appealing, however, to such we-centric viewpoint seems to be partic-
ularly relevant when one has to adopt goals that are not of any participant but
of the group itself. In such cases, an agent has to act as a group member, and
this shift of identity can also have dramatic consequences. A paradigmatic
example is offered by a team leader who has to select people under budget
constraints: Being forced to a choice, an agent thinking of herself as a chief
has to make a choice in the group’s interests without taking into account the
third-person perspective of those he has to fire.
A theory that is able, in fact, to account for the possible discrepancy
between ego-centric and we-centric preferences is Sugden’s (1993, 2000)
theory of team preferences.24 Sugden’s theory allows the agents, who take
themselves to be members of the team, to care for their team in a way that is
not reduced to the maximization of the utilities of the individual members. The
core of the proposal is that preferences should be attributed to a unit of
agency, which is not necessarily an individual. Accordingly, if the unit of
agency is the team, one can identify a consistent set of preferences over
possible outcomes that the team has the power to achieve. Hence, when one
acts as a team member, one is acting for the team with the aim of maximizing
a team utility function. Such team preferences are held by individuals that
identify with their team. This process yields independent preferences across
interacting participants, and by endorsing team reasoning, the team preferences
24 In a recent contribution on these issues, Sugden has sketched a different account of team reasoning that
appeals to intuitions coming from cooperative game theory. The agents that engage in team reasoning are
taken to choose the profile of actions that correspond to the one they would agree on if their agreement were
enforceable. This new approach is very similar in spirit to the one defended here; see Sugden (2011).
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of the agents allow them to choose actions that may even overtly contrast with
what they would choose as individuals.
When compared to my combination of allocentric preferences, allocentric utility
functions and joint allocentric reasoning, Sugden’s proposal might point to a different
mechanism to solve coordination and cooperation problems. The adoptive approach to
shared intention suggests that, in the kind of small-scale sociality that characterizes
simpler cases of joint actions like that of painting a house together, an appeal to a
different unit of agency is not actually needed for an appropriate explanation. Even if in
small-scale projects without structured groups, the unit of agency is still the individual
agent with his or her own personal egocentric preferences, this individualistic aspect
does not prevent one from switching to allocentric mind reading and allocentric
preferences, to take into account both one’s own and another agent’s perspective in an
impartial way and so to reason impartially from both perspectives at once.
Moreover, the appeal to team preferences dramatizes the interaction between an
individual and the group one might belong to. In contrast, allocentric preferences
focus on a similar interaction across individuals.
Despite their differences, the adoptive and the team-oriented approach might be, in
fact, complementary and focus on different processes. A more complete theory of
joint action should explain how these two mechanisms could be combined.
What is special of human collaborative ability?
Before concluding, I want to briefly elaborate on the possible consequences of the
adoptive approach to shared intention for the scientific study of human collaboration.
I have argued that two crucial interconnected cognitive abilities are essential to
explain human collaboration: allocentric mind-reading and (on this basis) goal
adoption. Hence, this approach supports a general prediction: Possible differences
between typical and atypical humans and between human and non-human primates
with respect to their collaborative abilities might be in part due to different levels in
(1) the ability to represent the interacting partner from an allocentric perspective and
(2) to switch between the egocentric perspective and the other-centred, allocentric
one. Though a full development of this egocentric–allocentric–switch hypothesis is
beyond the scope of this contribution, consider these two kinds of evidence.
Frith and de Vignemont (2005) have recently suggested that people with Asperger
syndrome (usually considered as a mild form of autistic disorder combined with high
verbal activity; Frith 2004) might be characterized precisely by an improper func-
tioning of the switch between the egocentric and allocentric kinds of social cognition.
People with Asperger syndrome have a high level social competence, but they fail
precisely in tasks that require full blown collaborative attitudes: Children with this
syndrome are not interested in cooperative play and adults have difficulties in being
selected as team members and to smoothly participate in group action. Somewhat
similarly, a vast amount of evidence collected by Michael Tomasello and his collab-
orators (Tomasello et al. 2005; Tomasello and Herrmann 2010) suggests that an
analogous pattern characterizes great apes’ cooperation. In fact, while humans and
great apes share many cognitive skills, the main difference lies in social cognitive
ones. Even if great apes are quite proficient mind readers, this ability is triggered
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especially in competitive (egocentric) contexts (Hare et al. 2006). Differently from
humans, great apes do not seem to engage in mind reading in cooperative contexts
and do not collaborate between themselves or with their human partners in the way
humans do: They are not interested in cooperative play, they do not have human
typical social responsiveness to the joint action and they do not help each other even
when it might be instrumentally useful to reach a common goal (Warneken et al.
2006; Warneken and Tomasello 2006). To explain this difference, Tomasello has
suggested that humans have evolved a specific set of ‘skills and motivations for
shared intentionality’. Since, however, such skills and motivations are not explained
further, it is not clear what actual difference is at stake here. The adoptive approach to
collaboration taken in this work suggests that either allocentric mind reading itself or
the more sophisticated ability to switch between egocentric and allocentric perspec-
tives when reasoning about others’ goals might be the core ability.
As a final note, it is interesting to remind that Piaget (1962/1995) himself, who has
notoriously emphasized the importance of decentred cognition for cognitive devel-
opment, has suggested that Vygotsky’s objections to Piaget’s individualism have
failed to appreciate ‘egocentrism itself qua obstacle to the coordination of viewpoints
and to cooperation’. The consequences of this idea for an appropriate explanation of
human collaborative abilities are still to be fully untapped.
Conclusion
Understanding the cognitive underpinnings of joint action is an area that is, lately,
attracting much interdisciplinary attention. Even if the evolutionary relevance of joint
action and collaboration and the underlying cognitive complexity have been
underestimated in the past, this situation is nowadays quickly changing.
The interplay between philosophy and other behavioural sciences, like psychology
and economics, is thus particularly timely because there is a need for integrative
conceptual frameworks that might support the formulation of new scientific theories
and facilitate interdisciplinary discussion. Philosophy can contribute to this enterprise.
The adoptive approach to shared intention is offered as a new conceptual frame-
work. It suggests that human collaboration is based on the ability to share mental
states like beliefs, goals and intentions. Focusing on shared intention in particular, it
contends that when two agents share an intention to act together, each individual has
an intention in favour of the joint action and in favour of a joint mode of reasoning.
Such mode of reasoning is identified with allocentric reasoning, that is, the ability to
reason and act in view of one’s own (allocentrically represented) goals and the goals
adopted from somebody else. Since personal intentions with respect to joint activity
(both action and reasoning) cannot be formed in isolation, it contends that these
intentions are possible thanks to reciprocal goal adoption. Since adopted goals are
conditional goals, reciprocal goal adoption creates a structure of interdependence
between the personal goals of the participants. Thus, the ability of goal adoption
emerges as a core cognitive ability whose role to understand human sociality should
be adequately addressed. In this paper, I have explored how basic mind-reading
abilities and allocentric representations might enable goal adoption and joint
allocentric reasoning.
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In order to argue for this view, I have borrowed tools from the planning theory of
intention (Bratman 1986) and from the game-theoretical approach to bargaining
problems. In particular, the extension of the standard framework as suggested by
Harsanyi (1977) and Binmore (2005) has been useful to identify the role of
allocentric mindreading and goal adoption in choosing the appropriate means for a
joint action.
As such, the adoptive approach to shared intention contributes to the scientific
study of joint action by identifying core abilities that the agents should display in
order to collaborate in view of common goals. Even if the chosen level of explanation
abstracts from underlying cognitive mechanisms, it is broadly compatible with
contemporary approaches that are focused on the role of action in cognition and that
emphasize the importance of off-line simulation to understand representing and
reasoning abilities (Pacherie 2008, 2012; Pezzulo and Castelfranchi 2009). By
pinpointing new precise abilities and their pre-requisite, the adoptive approach can
identify constraints at the level of cognitive mechanisms and can directly inform
empirical investigation in the domains of developmental and comparative psycholo-
gy. Whether the adoptive approach can successfully systematize empirical data is a
matter of future research.
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